COFC Decision Released: USAF Program IT Professional Support Services for Financial Information Systems

File No. 24-670

Background

On or around January 9, 2024, GSA issued Solicitation No. 47QFLA24Q0042 for “Program IT Professional Support Services for Financial Information Systems” (“the solicitation” or “RFQ”) and amended it on January 18, 2024.  AR 604, 539–540.  The contract was to provide information technology support to the Secretary of Air Force of Financial Management (“SAF/FM”) and the SAF/FM’s Air Force Financial Services Office’s (“AFFSO”) Financial Management Information Systems Office.  AR 541.  Greentree had been the incumbent on the contract since March 2012.  AR 414, 542.  The RFQ stated that the contract’s pricing was firm-fixed-price with cost reimbursable travel and other direct costs.  AR 541.  The period of performance was a one-year base period with four one-year options.  Id.

The solicitation requested quotes issued against the GSA Multiple Awards Schedule (“MAS”).  AR 541.  The RFQ explicitly provided “[t]his is not a FAR Part 15 negotiated competition; therefore, the procedures in FAR 15.3 (Source Selection) DO NOT apply to this solicitation.”  AR 550–551.  The parties agree that the solicitation, as a MAS procurement, was a Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”) procurement controlled by FAR 8.4 and in particular, FAR 8.405-2(d)’s rules governing evaluations.  See, e.g., AR 434 (citing FAR 8.4 as the “acquisition authority”), 800 (CSI’s submission of FSS price list information with its quote), 1720 (evaluating pricing per FAR 8.405-2(d)); Pl.’s Mot. at 17–18 (interpreting FAR 8.405-2(d)); Def.’s Mot. at 4 (same).  See also FAR 8.405-2(d).  The solicitation included a lengthy Performance Work Statement (“PWS”) detailing contract activities and requirements.  AR 570–603 …

Discussion

At issue is whether the Agency’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.  Celerapro, LLC v. United States, 168 Fed. Cl. 408, 425 (2023).  “[T]he Court reviews the agency’s procurement decision to determine whether it is supported by the administrative record.”  PAE Applied Techs., LLC v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 490, 504 (2021).  “[A] reviewing court may set aside a procurement action if (1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.”  Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Ultimately, if the Court finds an agency is within its bounds, it is not for the Court to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.”  CeleraPro, 168 Fed. Cl. at 425 (citing Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).

In reviewing procurement decisions, the Court applies a “presumption of regularity” and should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.  Logistics Co., Inc. v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 542, 553 (2022).  Contracting officers are “entitled to exercise discretion upon a broad range of issues.”  Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  “For that reason, procurement decisions invoke highly deferential rational basis review.”  Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).  “The rational basis test asks ‘whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation …

Decision

Procurement officials have substantial discretion to determine which proposal represents the best value for the government.” E.W. Bliss, 77 F.3d at 449.  On this record, the Agency’s decision that an experienced incumbent with a strong technical proposal offered the government the best value was a “coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.”  Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 992 (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., 365 F.3d at 1351).  Some of the Agency’s explanations were brief, particularly regarding the level of effort.  But Plaintiff did not establish prejudice on the record, and the Court is satisfied that FAR 8.4’s requirements were met.  Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and GRANTS the Government’s and Defendant-Intervenor’s Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record.  The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.

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